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What's Right with Welfare?
The Other Face of AFDC'
RONALD B. DEAR
University of Washington
School of Social Work
Eleven million people, mostly mothers and children, depend on Aid to
Families with Dependent Children, America's largest child welfare pro-
gram. Much is wrong with AFDC welfare, and serious efforts are being
made, again, to reform it. So far, no major attempts at reform have
been successful. If reform is to succeed, we must understand what
needs to be corrected and what does not.
What's right with welfare? This study, not an apology or excuse
for AFDC, answers that rarely asked question. Part I surveys back-
ground. Part II cites myths and criticisms of AFDC and portrays pov-
erty as it afflicts children and female-headed households. The focus of
the analysis is on the depiction of 12 positive features of AFDC. Hidden
in this unpopular form of aid are income transfer policy principles
important to any consideration of welfare reform. To overlook these
principles and to continue to ignore what is right with welfare may
doom all efforts at reform.
Our blindness to what is good about AFDC extends to most public
social programs and all become vulnerable to attack and budget reduc-
tions. Americans need to be made aware of the desirable aspects of
their social programs. By scrutinizing AFDC, the most maligned of
programs, this analysis is a step in that direction.
Everyone knows what's wrong with the Aid to Families with
Dependent Children (AFDC) program. It is generous, expensive,
and ineffectual; it is "welfare"2 for mothers with children. Con-
servatives claim it squanders public taxes and fosters depend-
ency, and liberals maintain it is primitive and stingy. The press
headlines its fraud and its waste. Politicans suggest that solving
the "welfare problem" would resolve our fiscal predicament, get
state and federal budgets back in balance, and make government
fiscally responsible. AFDC administrators, line workers, and
clients themselves derogate the program; staff is demoralized,
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clients detest its complicated application procedure and stig-
matized support. Nobody likes AFDC.
Purpose
How much of the negative feeling surrounding AFDC is
based on fact? This article takes a "stop and think" approach to
show that AFDC, with its flaws, serves many critical functions
in American social welfare. Indeed, to reduce AFDC further or
to eliminate it entirely, as is occasionally suggested, would prove
disastrous.
Let's face it: most public social programs in America, and
especially those designed for poor people, have a bad name.
"This is the land of plenty; work hard and cash in"-is our ethic.
Since virtually all of us receive aid from social programs some-
time during our lifetime-frequently for long periods of time-
this inability to see good in social provision programs in general
and in AFDC in particular is national blindness.
What was the origin of this unpopular program? Part I, "The
Background of AFDC," briefly examines the context of AFDC
and its predecessor, mothers' pensions, defines social assistance
and shows how the grant level was set. Major changes across a
53-year history chart the course of welfare reform.
Part II lists two dozen myths about AFDC and also cites five
common criticisms. This is the "first face" of welfare and the
face with which we are all familiar. Part II also presents 12 pos-
itive features of AFDC. What would happen if AFDC ceased to
be funded? Who would be hurt? What are the income alterna-
tives for those who depend on it? In other words, what is right
with welfare? Not an apology or whitewash, the intent of this
critique is to document that AFDC does indeed have another
side, a second face that is positive and beneficial.
Part I. The Background of AFDC
Mothers' Pensions
Prior to passage of the Social Security Act in 1935 and the
commencement of a national Aid to Dependent Children pro-
gram, nearly all states had enacted legislation that would provide
public aid to children in their own homes. Mothers' pensions
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("mothers' aid," "mothers' assistance," "widows' pensions") were
public grants in cash or in kind given to selected homes where
the male breadwinner was absent. These pensions had much in
common with relief under the poor law, but they introduced
several new relief concepts and were a prelude to the Aid to
Dependent Children program.
Mothers' pensions were evidence of public recognition of
the long-term nature of childrearing and of the contribution a
mother could make in a fatherless home (Social Security in
America, 1937, pp. 233-234). Following the recommendations of
the 1909 White House Conference on the Care of Dependent
Children, mothers' pensions were designed to prevent the
breakup or disruption of families solely because of povery.3
Such aid enabled mothers to stay at home, thereby prevent-
ing institutionalization of the children. Not only could the child
be cared for best in his/her own home, but also "the mothers'
contribution to the home ... was [usually] greater than her
earnings outside the home" (Social Security in America, 1937,
p. 234). Grace Abbott (1934, p. 191) contended that mothers' aid
ushered in a new principle in public assistance, that of ade-
quacy. The first mothers' pension law was enacted in Missouri
in 1911 and applied only to Jackson County. The first statewide
law as enacted in Illinois in the same year. Within ten years,
laws had been passed in 41 states and by 1935, all but two
(Georgia and South Carolina) of the 48 states had such legisla-
tion (Lundberg, 1930, pp. 273-274).
States were quick to pass mothers' pension laws but slow to
implement them. In 1928, for example, when 44 states had such
legislation, fewer than 50% used them (Lundberg, 1928, p. 446).
Moreover, when the laws were in use, implementation varied
widely; many areas gave out small amounts of money that were
hardly more than tokens of aid.
In any case, mothers' aid was largely an urban program. In
1934, just prior to passage of the Social Security Act, 51% of all
recipients lived in only nine cities (Social Security in America,
1937, p. 238), and these cities accounted for more than two-
thirds of total expenditures in the country. Six states had fewer
than 200 families receiving aid (Abbott, 1934, p. 207).
Moral overtones strongly affected state policies. Aid was re-
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served largely for a group Bell called the "gilt-edged widows"
(1965, p. 9). One study showed that in 1932, 82% of those in
receipt of aid were widows, of whom 96% were white (cited in
Bell, p. 9). Not surprisingly, only a tiny minority of those in
need received assistance. In 1930, there were 3.8 million female-
headed families in the United States, and, of these, slightly over
one million were headed by widows. Less than 3% of families
at risk received aid and "less than 0.7 of 1% of all children under
18 years of age.., were covered by the program" (Bell, p. 14).
By 1934, it was becoming clear that the success or failure of
an income maintenance program (as measured by grant level,
degree of implementation, and proportion of the at-risk popu-
lation covered) frequently depended upon whether local partic-
ipation was obligatory or optional and also upon which unit of
government instituted, supervised, and helped to finance the
program. In retrospect, the history of mothers' aid underscores
the notion that in social programs, larger units of government
achieve wider implementation, greater uniformity, and tend to
provide higher benefits than do smaller units of government.
The Social Security Act and ADC
Current public assistance programs (also called "welfare,"
public aid, or social assistance) were established in the mid-1930s
as part of the omnibus Social Security Act (P.L. 271, 1935). They
were public programs designed to help or "assist" a few selected
categories of needy people (children, elderly, blind), and, as a
consequence, are also referred to as "categorical aid" or as "cat-
egorical programs." For those who fit the defined category, the
major determinant for eligibility has always been income and
level of need. In contrast to social insurance criteria, eligibility
is rarely linked to prior employment of the applicant or a mem-
ber of the applicant's family. (In some states, AFDC-E may be
linked to prior employment.) Social assistance is given to indi-
viduals and families in several forms, most frequently cash,
medical care (Medicaid), food stamps, and social services.
All aid is financed out of public funds, derived from a vary-
ing and complex combination of federal, state, and, in some
instances, local revenues. Federal revenues are derived mainly
from individual and corporate income taxes (90 percent) excise,
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customs, duties, and a variety of other minor revenue sources.
State and local revenues are derived from income, property, sales,
excise and other sources such as gas tax, user fee, etc. With the
exception of the sales tax, most of the federal and state revenue
sources are comparatively progressive. Unlike financial support
for social security and unemployment insurance, no specially
earmarked taxes or payroll taxes paid by employers and/or em-
ployees are used to finance public assistance.
Complex funding, varying eligibility conditions, and limit-
ing aid to selected categories of people may not seem the most
effective way to organize large social programs. Why would pol-
icy makers develop such an uncoordinated medley of programs?
These patchwork programs only make sense when viewed in
the historical context of the period of national crisis in which the
legislation was passed, the framework of the Social Security Act,
and the predecessor programs of mothers' pensions, old-age
pensions, and pensions for the blind. Aid to Dependent Chil-
dren (ADC, title IV), Old-Age Assistance (OAA, title I), and
Aid to the Blind (AB, title X) were the three social assistance
titles of the five income transfer sections in the original Social
Security Act, signed into law August 14, 1935. In theory, this
form of aid was supposed to "wither away" and to be superseded
increasingly by old-age insurance ("social security," title II) and,
to a lesser degree, by unemployment insurance (title III). In short,
the three public assistance titles of the Social Security Act were
viewed as emergency measures, designed to take effect imme-
diately in a time of high unemployment, widespread hunger,
destitution and homelessness. The nation was in a prolonged
economic depression and national crisis. Most private charities
had run out of money, and some state and local governments
were close to bankruptcy.
Thus, it is not surprising that President Franklin Roosevelt
called ADC "a safeguard gainst misfortune which cannot be
wholly eliminated in this man-made world of ours." In creating
ADC, for the first time the federal government accepted the re-
sponsibility to help states underwrite the support of children
who had been deprived of a parent because of death, disability,
or desertion. Most important, the program provided a means-
spearheaded and partly financed from the federal treasury-to
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care for those children in their own homes, rather than in in-
stitutions, as had been the common practice before (Ross, 1985,
pp. 5-6).
In ADC, federal and state governments shared fiscal and
program responsibility. Annual appropriations from general
revenues provided for the federal share of program costs. To
receive money, each state had to adopt a plan subject to federal
approval: among other things, the plan had to be effective in all
political subdivisions of the state, provide a single administering
agency, institute a process for appeal of denied claims, require
regular reports to the Social Security Board, and put a limitation
on residency requirements. States were free to establish their
own eligibility requirements and benefit levels, and to be as
restrictive and as discretionary as they chose.
Setting the ADC Grant Level
The original bill did not limit the federal share of the ADC
grant, except to say that it should be no more than one-third of
the amounts expended by state and local governments. The one-
third figure, suggested by the Children's Bureau, was based on
the belief "that state and local governments should each bear
one-third of the cost of this aid" (Witte, 1963, pp. 164-165).
In the old-age assistance program, however, Congress had
already decided to pay for one-half the total OAA benefit, up to
a federal maximum of $15 a month for each recipient. Thus, if
a state chose to pay an elderly person $15 per month, the total
federal/state benefit was $30 a month. Theoretically, a two-per-
son elderly couple household could receive as much as $60 a
month. Of course, states were free to pay less (or more) than
$15 a month to an elderly person. If they paid more, the federal
limit of $15 would remain.
Several members of the House Ways and Means Committee
thought there should also be a limit on the ADC grant. What
would be an appropriate maximum? It was suggested
... that the limitation should be the same amount as the maxi-
mum pension payable to children of servicemen who lost their
lives in World War I, namely, $18 per month for the first child and
$12 for the second and additional children in the family. In making
this suggestion, the congressman completely overlooked the fact
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that under the Veterans Pension Act [an additional] grant of $30
per month is made to the widow .... (Witte, p. 163)
In ADC no money was to be provided to the mother or caretaker.
Witte, in his chronicle of the Act, tells us that "no one pointed
out this fact at the time, and ... [the] motion was adopted with-
out dissent" (pp. 163-164). As a result, when the ADC program
began payments on February 1, 1936, the federal government
agreed to pay one-third of the state's ADC expenditure with a
federal ceiling of $6 per month for the first child (one-third of
$18) and $4 for each additional child (one-third of $12).
In establishing the ADC program, Congress commmited
three major blunders: (a) It fixed the maximum matchable aid
for children at the unreasonably low levels of $18 and $12 per
month. (b) It agreed to pay only one-third of these small maxi-
mums. (c) It failed to provide any money to the adult caretaker.
These oversights had an immediate impact. Under the adult
program of OAA, a two-person family (an elderly couple) could
receive as much as $60 a month. In the children's program a
three-person family (mother with two children) could receive a
maximum of $30 per month. Two people on OAA could receive
twice as much as three people on ADC. Witte states:
... I called the attention of. . . members of the House committee
to the fact that this limitation would operate to keep the federal
grants below one-third of the states' expenditures in many cases;
further, that it was utterly illogical to expect a mother with a child
under sixteen to live on $18 per month when old age assistance
grants of $30 per month per person were contemplated in the same
act. This was acknowledged to be a justified criticism, but there
was so little interest on the part of any of the members in the aid
to dependent children that no one thereafter made a motion to
strike out the restriction.
He adds,
There was little interest in Congress in the aid to dependent
children. It is my belief that nothing would have been done on
this subject if it had not been included in the report of the Com-
mittee on Economic Security. That the grants to states for this pur-
pose are limited to one-third of their expenditures, while the grants
for old age assistance and blind pensions are for one-half of the
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expenditures, reflects this complete lack of interest in the aid for
dependent children. (Witte, p. 164)
One half century later this Congressional disinterest in de-
pendent children continues; the errors that resulted in large grant
disparities still await correction. Those in the adult categories-
the aged, blind, and disabled-now covered under Supplemen-
tal Security Income (SSI) continue to receive two to three times
more money than children and their families. For example, in
August 1988, the average federally administered SSI payment
was $260 per person per month. Twenty-eight states gave an
additional $113 a month. Under SSI a single person might receive
$373 per month and a couple $746 (Social Security Bulletin, Nov.
1988, p. 51). By contrast, in March 1988, the average AFDC pay-
ment was $127 per recipient per month or $371 for a three-person
family. The range was $38 a month for a recipient in Mississippi
to $198 in California (Monthly Benefit Statistics, Oct. 1988, p. 12).
Major Changes in ADC and AFDC, 1939-1988
In spite of a negative view of welfare, Congress and the
courts have expanded entitlement and increased benefits over
the past half century. The fact that conservative Republicans once
urged higher welfare benefits (note 4) now appears a strange
anomaly, a curious historical footnote. However, they joined the
Democrats in 1939 to extend eligibility to children 16 and 17
years of age if attending school. Later, 18 to 20 year olds were
also made eligible if attending school. (Recently this age was
reduced so that a child must be under 18 and in school.)
A change in 1950 made a needy relative living with an eli-
gible child a recipient. For the first time, a state would receive
federal matching funds if it gave aid to an ADC adult (Social
Security Act Amendments of 1950). In 1961, the Unemployed
Parent program (ADC-UP) made a child eligible for ADC when
one parent in a two-parent household became unemployed (So-
cial Security Act Amendments of 1961). In 1962, a major pro-
gram change included a second adult as a recipient for federal
matching purposes. At this time the program changed its name
from ADC to AFDC, "F" implying a program for families-not
just for dependent children (Public Welfare Amendments of 1962).
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Numerous alterations have been made in the complex federal
matching formula, nearly all designed to give states a more gen-
erous match and to encourage higher benefits to recipients.
Aside from the name change, all these changes were optional
to the states: they were free to extend eligibility if they chose to
do so. For instance, only 28 of the 54 states and jurisdictions
give aid to families with an unemployed parent, and in those
states it is a tiny program.
The Continuous Search for Welfare Reform
The last three decades have seen numerous efforts at welfare
reform. Most attempts have focused on reducing the size of the
welfare rolls by helping recipients become self-sufficient. The
Social Security Amendments of 1967 established the Work In-
centive Program (WIN). Mothers with children over 6 were re-
quired to register for work. Employment Security and the state
welfare department were to assist dients in counseling, training,
and job referral. Never considered cost effective, WIN under-
went many changes and has been superseded by the Job Op-
portunities and Basic Skills Training program of 1988. No separate
funding has been requested for fiscal 1990.
During the early 1970s, Nixon pursued his Family Assistance
Program (FAP). Perhaps the most daring effort at reform, Nixon's
plan would have provided a national income guarantee for all
needy families with children. It was defeated because one con-
tingent thought the plan and its benefits too liberal and far
reaching. Oppositon also came from those who believed the
proposed guarantee too low. The Carter administration recom-
mended a Better Jobs and Income bill. This proved no more
successful than the Nixon plan, but it did reflect the growing
conviction that any welfare reform should incorporate work re-
quirements. The various Negative Income Tax experiments of
the 1960s and 1970s also reflected the intense interest Congress
and the public had in the effect of income and tax rates on work
efforts.
The 1980s have seen increasing attention and innovation
shifting to the states. Massachusetts, California, New Jersey,
Ohio, New York City, and Washington State have started their
own reform efforts, usually with the blessing (and necessary
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waivers) from the federal government. A number of states have
introduced work programs. Yet another tack to reform welfare
has been to increase administrative efficiency (Brodkin, 1986).
The most recent federal effort at welfare reform saw a some-
what grudging agreement between Democrats and Republicans
and resulted in the Federal Support Act signed by President
Reagan October 13, 1988. It provides a Job Opportunities and
Basic Skills (JOBS) program, offers transitional child care and
medical assistance, requires all states to provide welfare to two-
parent families, and, not surprisingly, emphasizes moving the
welfare parent, usually the mother, out of the home and into the
work force. Far from perfect, the act does provide limited new
funds for education, support services, and child support en-
forcement. Over the next five years, federal reform will cost
about four percent above current costs, not counting inflation
or program expansion.
Whatever may be said regarding welfare reform, work is
only part of the answer. AFDC mothers are the only employable
people on welfare, and of these mothers, perhaps one-third are
employable. The rest are already working, in training, incapa-
citated, or needed at home. These employable mothers constitute
a tiny 6.7% of all 17 million welfare recipients; the rest are chil-
dren, or blind or disabled or aged persons. Roughly 11% of all
AFDC families indude a male, and they constitute but 2% of all
those on welfare. Many of these men are unable to work because
of disability.
The American welfare system does need to be improved.
"Real" welfare reform, where employable persons are aided in
becoming self-sufficient, has remained an elusive goal. Critics
and reformers alike fail to acknowledge that helping people be-
come self-supporting is extremely expensive. It is likely that the
aim of reforming welfare and the aim of saving tax dollars are
mutually exdusive goals. Reform will cost more than the amount
we now pay for welfare, at least in the short run.
The True Cost of AFDC
The constant criticism, debate, analysis, and attempt to re-
form welfare are remarkable in light of the financial commitment
actually made to AFDC. In Reagan's proposed budget of $1.1
What's Right with Welfare?
trillion for fiscal 1990 (10/1/89-9/30/90), total federal outlays for
AFDC cash payments are estimated to be $8.5 billion (Appendix
to U.S. Budget, 1990, p. 1-K 38). AFDC constitutes 0.7 of 1% of
the budget. Tracing federal expenditures back 30 years shows
little variation: AFDC has never exceeded 1.2% of the federal
budget. Recipients of income for all means-tested cash pro-
grams5 rose from 5.8 million in 1960 to approximately 17 million
today, a period that encompassed the War on Poverty and the
greatest beneficiary increase in 50 years. Surprisingly, and in
spite of this threefold increase, public assistance cash grants as
a proportion of all federal expenditures remained fairly constant,
reaching a high of 3.2% for one year (but usually much less)
(Dear, 1982, pp. 26-30).
By comparison, in fiscal 1990, $22 billion, about 2% of the
federal budget, has been allocated to all means-tested cash as-
sistance. In addition to AFDC, this induded SSI, earned income
tax credit, refugee assistance, and low income energy assistance.
Outlays for food stamps were an additional $12.8 billion (U.S.
Budget, 1990).
Why all the fuss? From the standpoint of cost (political rhet-
oric notwithstanding), welfare, particularly AFDC, is not a big-
ticket item. Why the outpouring of energy and time aimed at
reducing it further? Apparently, negative and distorted views of
welfare are rooted in societal beliefs about poverty, low income,
and illegitimacy. Further, there is evidence that this form of
assistance is unpopular in other countries as well as in the USA.
Part II: The Two Faces of AFDC
A. The First Face of AFDC: What's Wrong with Welfare?
Myths and Criticisms
Myths about AFDC welfare abound and some contain a grain
of truth. However, few apply to a large percentage of recipients
and none apply to a majority. Of the following generalizations,
not a single one applies to all recipients, and most are simply
untrue:
1. Once on welfare, always on welfare.
2. The welfare population consists of a permanent, dependent
class of recipients.
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3. The federal government faces a large budget deficit because so
much is spent on programs like AFDC.
4. Half of the money in the federal budget is spent on programs
for poor people.
5. Women on AFDC/welfare have more children to get more
money.
6. Poor people migrate to states with high AFDC benefits to get
on welfare.
7. Welfare families tend to be larger than families not on welfare
and have more children than nonwelfare families.
8. All children on welfare are born out of wedlock.
9. Most mothers receiving AFDC are in their teens.
10. To get more money, AFDC applicants try to cheat the system
by deliberately misrepresenting the facts. As a result, the sys-
tem is rife with fraud.
11. Most people on welfare simply cannot handle money.
12. If you give more money to people on welfare, they will prob-
ably spend it on drink or in other nonworthwhile ways.
13. Almost no welfare mothers have finished high school.
14. Most welfare families are black.
15. Benefits are purposely low in some areas because it costs less
to live there.
16. In some states benefits are so high that recipients have little
motivation to get off of the rolls.
17. The majority of AFDC families live in private housing and a
good number own their own homes.
18. Benefit levels have been rising fast or faster than inflation.
19. Families on welfare living in states with more generous grant
levels are brought well above the poverty line.
20. A large number of AFDC families have two able-bodied adult
recipients.
21. Most AFDC families consist of able-bodied adults too lazy to
work or seek employment.
22. Almost no AFDC parents work, are in training, or are looking
for a job.
23. People can receive a sizeable amount from employment and
still remain on welfare.
24. Those on welfare have little incentive to work. 6
The above generalizations are faulty, but there is much that
can be legitimately criticized about AFDC. First, grant levels are
pitifully low. Not a single state provides enough cash income to
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bring a mother with one or two children up to the admittedly
low official poverty line. (Food stamps do help, but even with
food stamps few families are brought up to the poverty level.)
The larger the family, the lower the per capita grants. In March
1988, the average monthly payment per person in all states was
$127 per month and for a family of three the average grant was
$371 per month or $4,452 per year, one-half of the poverty level
of $9,690 for a family of three (Monthly Benefit Statistics; Social
Security Bulletin, April 1988, p. 2). Furthermore, the average ob-
scures a wide variation in payments: Mississippi pays $38 a
month; California, $198. Finally, while they are required to de-
fine a standard of need for AFDC families, the states are not
required to meet it. Few make the attempt.
A second legitimate criticism of AFDC concerns its difficult,
demeaning, and painful application procedures. Those seeking
AFDC assistance must complete long, complex forms and pro-
vide numerous personal documents. Clients often wait many
hours with their small children in an overcrowded room to see
a harried, underpaid, overworked, eligibility worker who has
but a few minutes to review the complex forms and to answer
questions. If there is a mistake or an omission on the application,
or if additional supporting documents are required (e.g., rent
receipts, electric bills, birth certificates, records of prior em-
ployment, etc.), the weary applicant is told to return another
day to repeat the long procedure. Getting an answer to a simple
question ("Is this where I apply for Medicaid?") may require an
entire day sitting in the waiting room. At times, aid is denied
based on the judgment or discretion of the eligiblity worker. In
short, one applies for welfare-one does not claim it.
A third legitimate criticism of welfare is that many of the
rules, regulations, forms, and procedures differ in each of the
54 states and jurisdications. A needy person may receive ben-
efits in one state and be denied benefits in another. Equally
needy families will receive unequal amounts of aid. In only one-
half of the 54 states and jurisdictions two-parent families are
eligible to apply for aid.
AFDC policies may be criticized because they are sometimes
contradictory. To cite only one example, considerable emphasis
is placed on getting AFDC parents into the workforce to become
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self-sufficient. However, when people do receive income from
work under AFDC, they face an unusually high tax rate. The
1981 Social Security amendments changed the tax rate to 67%
for the first four months and 100% thereafter. After four months,
for each dollar earned, one dollar of benefits is lost. In addition,
the fully employed former recipient also loses access to medical
care, child care, and other in-kind benefits.
The fifth criticism relates to the quality of life and the daily
struggle of the typical AFDC mother. The life of the AFDC family
is perhaps indescribable by middle-class standards. Certainly,
conditions are worse than stated here or described in most lit-
erature or realized by those who wage their untiring criticism
of the "welfare mess" and of "all those bums on welfare."
AFDC grants and food stamp allotments are insufficient, and
families routinely run out of money before the end of the month.
How do people survive on so little income? Some welfare moth-
ers ransack supermarket garbage bins (called "garbaging)-really
a modem update of Biblical gleaning-to get enough food for
their children. Others sell their blood plasma twice a week for
about $10 a pint to gain desperately needed additional income.
Still others pilfer Good Will drop-off bins to get clothing for
themselves and their children. To spare themselves the embar-
rassment of going barefoot, recipients may borrow footware to
go to the doctor, to school, or for other appointments. (In one
ironic instance, a family borrowed shoes to go to a welfare eli-
gibility review, where they had to assure the worker they were
still in need.) Some mothers, in absolute desperation, resort to
prostitution to get money.
Such actions, most illegal, and others, were related by AFDC
mothers to the writer, and these women live in a state noted for
the generosity of its welfare benefits. One wonders how mothers
in less generous states manage. (Twenty-four jurisdictions pro-
vide average payments of less than $100 a month per recipient)
(Monthly Benefit Statistics, Oct. 1988, p. 12).
The myths about welfare and its legitimate criticisms con-
stitute the first face of AFDC, the one that is visible and best
known. There are, of course, other myths and additional criti-
cisms. Such a summary underscores program difficulties in a
broad political and academic sense. Unfortunately, it understates
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the personal decisions that face every AFDC family, especially
the mother each day of her life. What is good and desirable in
a program so easily discredited? The following section discusses
12 positive characteristics of AFDC.
B. The Second Face of AFDC Unmasked: What's Right
with Welfare?
1. AFDC directs benefits to families with the highest risk of
poverty and for whom there is no viable income alternative.
"The dilemma must be faced: the chief cause of poverty in
modem society is children." So claimed the late Alva Myrdal in
1941 in Nation and Family (p. 66). Aside from the USA, virtually
every advanced nation has faced the dilemma by adopting fam-
ily allowance programs. Most plans in these 63 nations provide
monthly grants of money to mothers for each child in every
family, regardless of income (Social Security Program Throughout
the World, 1987, 1988). Here, the public social policy closest to
universal allowances is the federal income tax exemption for de-
pendents, a once-a-year provision of little value to those with
low income (and low tax rates) and of no value to those with no
income. There is also AFDC, specifically designed to direct as-
sistance to high-risk families with children and for whom no
other aid is available. Can AFDC be justified? Are there other
income alternatives to this form of public aid?
Recent data show 32.5 million Americans (13.5% of the pop-
ulation) living in poverty in 1987. Of the 32.5 million poor, 66%
were white, 30% black, and the remainder of other races. (Per-
sons of Spanish origin may be classified as black or white). Of
65.1 million families, 7.0 million or 10.8% were poor (U.S. Bu-
reau of the Census, Current Population Report [CPS], P-60,
No. 161, Aug. 1988, pp. 7, 38).
Unhappily, these statistical dice are loaded: In spite of the
fact that two-thirds of all poor people are white, a white person
in America has only 11 chances in 100 of being poor. For black
Americans, the chances of being poor jump to 33% or 1 in 3.
Of course, additional characteristics boost the probability of
poverty, such as sex of family head and the number of children
in the family.
Forty percent of all poor persons are children under 18 years
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of age. Both the number and percent of children in poverty have
risen; 12.4 million boys and girls under 18 live in families with
incomes below the poverty level. The Census Bureau concludes,
The poverty rate for children continues, as it has since 1975, to be
higher than that for other age groups, averaging 20.6% for those
under 18 years, while that for persons 65 years and over was 12.2%
in 1987, and the poverty rate for persons 18 to 64 was 10.8% (CPS,
P-60, No. 161, p. 8).
As Table 1 dearly illustrates, husband/wife or married-cou-
ple households are the norm, representing more than eight in
ten of all families. Female-headed households (no husband pres-
ent) are still the exception, and households headed by men are
a tiny minority: of the 65 million families in 1987, 10.6 million
or 16% were headed by women and less than a million were
headed by men. However, husband-wife households have de-
dined from 90% in 1959 to 84% in 1987, whereas female-headed
households better than doubled in number, growing from 4.5
million to 10.6 million.
Between 1959 and 1987 total families increased by 44% (from
45.1 to 65.1 million), and female-headed families increased by
Table 1
Number and Percent of all Families by Head of Household:
Selected Years 1959-1987 (in millions)
1959 1977 1987
No. % No. % No. %
Husband/Wife 40.6 90 49.0 86 54.5 84
Female (no male) 4.5 10 8.2 14 10.6 16
Male (no female)a NA NA NA
Totals 45.1 100% 57.2 100% 65.1 100%
aTotal number of male households with no wife present is included in
husband/wife households. They represent a tiny percentage of all households
(approximately 1 to 2%). Data not available separately for each year.
Note. Derived from data in U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population
Reports, Series P-60, No. 161 (1988, August), Money Income and Poverty Status
in the United States: 1987 (Advance Data From the March 1988 Current Population
Survey), Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, Table 20, pp. 38-
39; 1959 & 1977 data are from Current Population Reports for prior years.
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a stunning 136% (from 4.5 to 10.6 million). Most AFDC cases
are drawn from the women and children in these low income
households. Table 2 demonstrates that although the number and
the percentage of all families classified as poor declined from
1959 to 1977, recent years have seen an upswing in family pov-
erty. The critical difference lies in the composition of this group
of poor families. In 1959, one-fifth of all poor families were
headed by women. In 1987, over one-half of all poor families
were headed by women. Indeed, the single most striking trend
in poverty statistics over the last quarter century has been this
dramatic increase in poverty in female-headed households.
Evidently, the two-parent, often two wage-earner, household
has greatly reduced the risk of poverty. Bearing in mind that
10.8% of all families were in poverty in 1987, and that the risk
of poverty in a family was about one in eight, what is the risk
of poverty for a child raised in a two parent family versus that
of a child raised in a single parent household? Table 3 shows
that a child's risk of poverty is only 6% or about 1 in 17 in a
husband/wife household. In a female-headed household, the risk
is 34% or about 1 in 3.
Table 2
Number and Percent of Poor Families Classified by Head of Household:
Selected Years 1959 -1987 (in millions)
1959 1977 1987
Family Type No. % No. % No. %
Married Couple 6.1 76 2.7 49 3.1 43.7
Female Head 1.9 20 2.6 48 3.6 51.5
Male Head .3 4 .3 3 .3 4.8
Total Poor Families 8.3 100% 5.3 100% 7.0 100%
% of all families
classified as poor 18.3% 9.3% 10.8%
Note. Derived from data in U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population
Report, Series P-60 (various years), Characteristics of the Population Below the
Poverty Level, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.
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In any event, regardless of who heads the household, the
more children, the greater the chance of poverty, as Table 4 am-
ply demonstrates. More children increases the risk of poverty
for all families, two parent, one parent, white, and black. While
the number of families in the United States with five or more
related children was comparatively small in 1987, there was a
50% chance that a child in a family of that size would be in
poverty. If the parents were black, there was a 71% chance that
the child would live in poverty.
The link between family size and poverty, and that between
family size/race and poverty, is clear and has existed for years.
But the link between family size/race/female-headed households
and poverty is so striking that it is the most compelling of all
poverty data.
Table 5 shows that a white mother with one child has a 30%
chance of poverty. Her black counterpart has a 42% chance.
Again, the close correlation between number of children and
probability of poverty is evident: the more children, the more
poverty. A white mother with four children and no husband
Table 4
Poverty Rate by Number of Related Children Under 18 in All
Families, 1987
All Families Percent of
(Poor & Nonpoor) Households Below
Millions Poverty Level
Percent All
No. of Children No. of Total Races White Black
None under 18 31.1 47.9 4.9 4.0 14.4
1 child 14.4 22.0 12.0 9.7 25.6
2 children 12.5 19.2 13.8 10.7 35.2
3 children 4.9 7.5 24.4 18.3 52.7
4 children 1.5 2.3 35.3 26.5 57.5
5 children or more 0.7 1.1 49.0 39.4 71.0
Total 65.1 million 100%
Note. Derived from data in U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population
Reports, Series P-60, No. 161 (1988, August), Money Income and Poverty Status
in the United States: 1987 (Advance Data From the March 1986 Current Population
Survey), Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, Table 19, p. 36.
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present has a 73% chance of poverty; a black mother similarly
situated has an astonishing 87% chance-and these poverty
rates exist after all income transfers.
Clearly, there are people in the United States who are poor
and who cannot support themselves. We even know something
about the incidence of poverty and about its population. We
know that a child born into a family where there are other sib-
lings and where the mother is a single head of household and
black-that child is likely to live in poverty at some time in his
or her life. (Other factors, not discussed here, further increase
the risk of poverty for such a child, such as having a mother
who lives in the South, who is unemployed and who lacks ed-
ucation.) Myrdal's observations are as accurate now as when she
made them:
The more children there are in a family the more decidedly will
poverty be their atmosphere. It will change the very volume of the
air they breath, reduce the food they eat, and narrow the margin
of culture available to them .... When a disproportionate number
Table 5
Poverty Rate of Female-Headed Households Classified by Race with
Number of Related Children Under 18, 1987
Total No. Percent Below
Female-Headed Poverty Level
No. of Children Households All Races White Black
None under 18 3.5 9.8 6.8 22.4
1 child 3.3 33.6 29.5 42.3
2 children 2.3 45.7 39.1 60.3
3 children 1.0 69.2 60.5 80.1
4 children 0.3 77.8 72.9 81.1
5 children' or more 0.2 86.7 - 86.9
Total 10.6 million
aFemale heads of household with more than five children are too few (less
than 75,000) to permit reliable calculations.
Note. Derived from data in U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population
Reports, Series P-60, No. 161 (1988, August), Money Income and Poverty Status
in the United States: 1987 (Advance Data From the March 1988 Current Population
Survey), Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, Table 19, p. 37.
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of the nation's children are born of the poor, this becomes a cause
of national worry ... (Myrdal, 1941, p. 99)
Without AFDC, many children would suffer from even more
severe poverty. Thus, AFDC decreases the suffering of the "de-
serving poor," especially children. And at times it may be the
difference between bare survival and death.
Are there other ways to achieve this end? As discussed be-
low, few alternatives to AFDC are acceptable on political or prac-
tical grounds. Neither social insurance, private charity, increased
assistance from state or local government, a guaranteed mini-
mum income, a universal demogrant, full employment, nor work
programs are viable options. Why not?
First, eligibility in all social insurance programs is based on
prior employment. Social security, unemployment insurance,
railroad retirement, workers' compensation, and temporary dis-
ability insurance-all are insurance programs designed for
workers, retired, injured, disabled, and their dependents; and,
for deceased workers, their survivors. These programs do aid
low-income families-far more than does social assistance. Un-
fortunately, millions of needy people have not worked and are
not covered by social insurance.
What about private charity and state and local governments?
In part, AFDC and its predecessor programs of Mothers' Aid
were established because private agencies could not meet the
financial needs of millions of needy people. Private charities do
not have the resources nor are they equipped to aid even a
fraction of the millions in financial need. State and local govern-
ments are not inclined to establish additional programs to help
their poor. They are even reluctant to adopt existing social pro-
grams that have generous federal support and to which they
need pay only part of the cost.
Certainly, there are public social program alternatives to
AFDC such as a universal demogrant, a generous children's al-
lowance, or a guaranteed minimum income. Establishing a na-
tional health service would be a giant step ahead, as would a
national incomes policy and greater availability of subsidized,
quality daycare. However, these alternatives to AFDC do not
appear politically feasible at this time. Federalizing the costs of
AFDC, as was done for the adult categories in SSI, might be the
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most reasonable advance, although current federal and state pol-
icies appear headed in the opposite direction.
For more than one-half century AFDC has been the major,
direct, and relatively inexpensive way to assist poor children
and their parents. It helps children whose parents are deceased
or unemployed; it helps children whose parents are separated,
divorced, or unmarried. Regardless of the cause of the need,
children require basic necessities, and AFDC helps to provide
these children and their caretakers with food, shelter, and med-
ical care.
2. AFDC provides money to millions of needy people.
AFDC assists the population it was intended to assist; it aids
those with the highest risk of poverty-families with children.
Approximately 3.8 million families received income from AFDC
in March 1988. Thus, in any single month, AFDC increases the
well-being of over 11 million low-income people, including more
than 7.3 million children and 3.7 million adults. A high rate of
client turnover makes it likely that AFDC benefits 16 to 17 mil-
lion individuals in approximately 6 million different households
over a year's time. Data for total individuals and households
aided each year are unavailable because an unduplicated count
is not maintained of those on welfare over the course of a year. 7
Perhaps as much as 7% of the United States' population and
about 15% of all 34 million families with children receive AFDC
over the course of a year. AFDC tends to be used as a temporary
source of income until other, more permanent means of support
can be found. Median length of time on AFDC is just over two
years, but many families receive aid for shorter periods, fre-
quently two to four months. Most women who use AFDC do
not get trapped by it. In light of program criticisms, this is not
surprising. On the other hand, the minority that stay on AFDC
a long time accumulate, and the majority of costs of AFDC are
for those who stay on for a long spell (Duvall, 1982; 1986 AFDC
Characteristics Study; Ellwood & Summers, 1986, pp. 71-72).
3. Each year AFDC transfers billions of dollars to low-income
-families and reduces or eliminates poverty in those it assists.
Cash social assistance expenditures are relatively small, es-
pecially when compared to the gigantic cash transfers made
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through social insurance.8 Approximately 4%-$16.5 billion-
of all cash income transfers was for AFDC in 1988.
Nevertheless, AFDC remains America's largest cash social
assistance program. Each year it transfers billions of dollars to
poor families to help them pay for housing, food, utilities, cloth-
ing, transporation, and other necessities. Grants are based on
need and the number of persons in the family. Without AFDC,
many families would lose their housing and go without food.
More than $17 billion will go to eligible low-income families in
fiscal 1990, a figure which includes a federal contribution, on
average, of 5 5 %. Table 6 summarizes the money transferred to
low-income families through AFDC from 1960 to 1989. Within
the last 19 years AFDC provided approximately $232 billion
(unadjusted dollars) to America's less fortunate families.
Receipt of AFDC cash benefits removes about 5% of its re-
cipient families from poverty. If the market value of noncash
transfers are included, then AFDC removes about 50% of its
families from poverty. For those not removed from poverty, the
mean poverty deficit for a typical three person AFDC family is
reduced from $7,807 to $3,242, after receipt of cash and noncash
benefits (U.S. Bureau of the Census, Technical Paper 58, 1988,
pp. 16-17). At the very least, AFDC relieves some of the agonies
of poverty.
4. AFDC recipients have ready access to a number of noncash
benefits.
One of the primary advantages of being an AFDC recipient
is a simultaneous and almost automatic right to in-kind benefits.
Defined as any "noncash benefit in a form other than money
which serves to enhance or improve the economic well-being of
the recipient," examples include medical care, surplus food, food
stamps, housing, and social services (CPR, P-60, No. 141, p. 21).
In 1987 the market value of means tested noncash benefits was
almost double that of all means tested cash assistance., The larg-
est component of means tested noncash aid is Medicaid, which
comprises 72% of such assistance (Technical Paper 58, 1988, p. 2).
In-kind benefits make a major contribution to the well-being of
low-income people.
Members of a family receiving AFDC are eligible for com-
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Table 6
Summary of AFDC Cash Transfer Payments, 1960-1989 (in billions)'
Year Total
1960-69
1970-79
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
b
Total Payments 1960 to 1989
$18,535,766
84,845,786
12,475,245
12,981,515
12,862,016
13,839,471
14,504,710
15,195,835
14,986,518
16,238,000
16,540,000
17,107,000
$250,111,863
aln unadjusted dollars. Totals do not include costs of administration. The
federal share of administration is now 50%. The federal share of cash pay-
ments averages 55% but ranges from 50 to 65%. States and localities pay the
remaining average of 45%.
bEstimate.
Note. Derived from data in Social Security Bulletin Annual Statistical Supplement
1987, p. 294; personal communication with Social Security Administration
for 1987 and 1988. The 1989 estimate is from Appendix to U.S. Budget, 1990,
p. 1-K, 38.
prehensive medical care under Medicaid, Title XIX of the Social
Security Act, passed into law in 1965. 9 To many low-income
people, access to health care for all family members is the single
most important benefit of welfare. Maybe they can get along
without much money, some think, but they cannot raise their
children without access to medical and dental care. As Table 7
shows, the largest number of recipients in the Medicaid program
are children and adults in AFDC households; they comprise
69% of all Medicaid recipients. However, even though they con-
stituted over two-thirds of Medicaid recipients, AFDC house-
holds account for only 24% of all expenditures (right half of
Table 7).
The left side of Table 8 lists an unduplicated count of medical
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Table 7
Unduplicated Number of Medicaid Recipients and Vendor Payments by
Eligibility Category, Fiscal 1986
a
Recipientsa Payments
(in thousands) (in millions)
Category No. % Amount %
Age 65 and over 3,140 14 $15,080 37
Blindness 81 .4 277 1
APTD 3,091 14 14,587 36
Children under 2 1b 9,954 44 5,096 12
AFDC adultsb 5,618 25 4,848 12
Other 1,138 6 992 2
Total 22,405 $40,878 100.0%
aRecipient categories do not add to unduplicated total because of the small
number of recipients that are in more than one category during the year.
bThe total unduplicated number of AFDC Medicaid recipients exceeds 11
million AFDC recipients for 1986. The AFDC client count is usually given for
December and does not reflect the total AFDC recipients for that year.
Note. Derived from data in Social Security Bulletin Annual Statistical Supplement
1987, Tables 169 & 171, pp. 253, 255.
services to Medicaid recipients. It shows 68.8 million units of
service, or an average of three units per recipient (68.8 million
units of service divided by 22 million recipients). However, the
cost of each unit or type of service varies considerably. A stay
in a nursing home or a mental hospital is more costly than a
visit to a doctor or a laboratory test.
The right side of Table 8 shows the actual cost of Medicaid
vendor payments by type of service. Fully 71% goes to inpatient
services in general hospitals, mental hospitals, skilled nursing
facilities, and intermediate care facilities, all services more likely
to be used by adults (and especially the elderly) than by young
people. Young people in AFDC families are likely to use phy-
sician and dental services and visit outpatient clinics.
The average annual value of Medicaid in 1982 for the four
major dasses of recipients appears in Table 9. Note the effect of
including the costs of institutional care for each recipient group:
For the nondisabled group under 21, institutional costs increase
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Table 8
Medicaid Benefits: Unduplicated Number of Recipients by Type of
Medical Service and the Amount and Percentage of Payment for Each
Type of Service, Fiscal 1986
Medicaid Vendor
Payments by Type of
Medical Service
No. of Recipients
for each service Amount
Type of Servicea (in thousands) (in millions) Percent
Inpatient 3,570 $11,406 28
Intermediate Care 1,034 11,798 29
Nursing Homes 570 5,651 14
Physician Services 14,808 2,545 6
Dental Services 5,143 529 1
Other Services
& Family Planning 5,184 478 1
Outpatient Hospital 10,711 1,983 5
Clinic Services 2,033 810 2
Laboratory Services 7,122 424 1
Home Health 593 1,352 3
Prescribed Drugs 14,704 2,692 7
Other Care 3,316 1,098 3
Total recipient
units of service 68,788 $40,878 100%
Total recipients 22,405
aRecipients may receive more than one type of service.
Note. Derived from data in Social Security Bulletin: Annual Statistical Supple-
ment 1987, Tables 168 & 171, pp. 252, 254.
expenditures by 2%; for those 65 and over, institutional care
increases expenditures by over 300%.
Other major noncash assistance for which AFDC families
may be eligible include food stamps, public housing, school
lunches, free or reduced-price school breakfasts, the Womens'
and Infants' Care program, and several child nutrition pro-
grams. In addition, a wide range of social services (costing some
$3 billion a year) is available. There are no separate data as-
sessing the value of most of these programs to an AFDC family.
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Table 9
Average Annual Market Value of Medicaid by Major Recipient
Groups in 1982 a
Including Excluding
Institutional Institutional
Recipient Group Expenditures Expenditures
Age 65 and over $3,349 $ 813
Blind and disabled 3,720 1,787
Ages 21-64, nondisabled 817 812
Less than 21, nondisabled 381 373
aEach state has its own value. Data are average for all 50 states and District
of Columbia.
Note. Derived from data in U.S. Bureau of the Census (1984), Technical Pa-
per 51, Estimates of Poverty, Including the Value of Noncash Benefits: 1979 to
1982. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office. Tables B7 & B9.
However, excepting social services, the value of all other noncash
programs is less than 10% of the Medicaid, food stamps, and
public housing.
What percent of AFDC families receive major noncash ben-
efits? Almost all AFDC families receive (or are at least eligible
to receive) medical benefits under Medicaid, and four-fifths re-
ceive food stamps. Two-fifths of AFDC children benefit from
school lunches and about one-fifth of AFDC families are in pub-
lic housing or receive HUD or other rent subsidies (Character-
istics of AFDC Recipients 1986).
What is the actual value of noncash benefits for a typical
AFDC family of three? Table 10 estimates the market value (not
the cost or the value to the recipient) of major noncash benefits
to such a family. The mean annual market value of food stamps
received by an AFDC family of three was $1,125 in 1987. Free
school lunches show an estimated annual value of $580 for two
children in 1987. The average annual market value of Medicaid
for an AFDC family of three was $2,166 in 1987, but the range
extended from less than $1,000 in some states to over $3,000 in
others (Technical Paper 58, 1988). It is difficult to count the value
of medical care as income. One family with a run of poor health
may far exceed the national or their state average. Another family
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Table 10
Estimated Market Value of Noncash Benefits for an AFDC Family of
Three in 1987 a
Program Market Value
Medicaid $2,166b
Housing 1,615c
Food Stamps 1,125
d
School Lunches 580
e
aThe market value of an in-kind transfer is equal to the private market pur-
chasing power of benefits received by individuals. The market value of med-
ical care is based on an insurance value approach, not on the amount of
medical care actually received.
'Average for entire United States. Amounts vary greatly among states. Cal-
culation is based on family of one adult, two children under 21. None are
disabled or institutionalized (see Technical Paper 58, Table B-6, p. 25).
'Based on assumption of three person household with income between $5,000
and $7,495 per year.
dThe market value assigned for food stamps was the annual face value or
purchasing power of food stamps in the market place (Technical Paper 58,
pp. 4, 21).
eFree school lunches (as opposed to reduced price) for two children for 167
days a year (Technical Paper 58, p. 21).
Note. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Technical Paper 58 (1988, August), Estimates
of poverty including the value of noncash benefits: 1987. Washington, DC: U.S.
Government Printing Office.
may be eligible to receive Medicaid but not use or require any
medical care in a given year.
The market value of housing subsidies for public or subsi-
dized housing vary by type of household, size of family, and
total household income. Therefore, generalizations about the
value of subsidized housing are difficult to make. However, for
a typical AFDC family with a housing subsidy, the value ap-
proximates $1,615. Very few families receive all four of the major
in-kind benefits. Thus, it is inappropriate to add all of these
benefits in Table 10 and apply this total to any individual house-
hold or use it as an average for all AFDC families. Nearly all
AFDC families have direct access to one or more noncash ben-
efits of food, medical care, and housing. Undoubtedly, these
benefits greatly increase familial well-being.
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5. AFDC is a public program.
AFDC is publicly sponsored and financed. Federal, state,
and local governments recognize the need and have taken re-
sponsibility for this category of needy people. The private sector
does not finance the construction of roads and airports, pay for
reconstruction required by national emergencies or disasters,
nor fund the welfare program. Private charities had a total outlay
of $87 billion in 1986. Forty-six percent went to religion, 14 to
health, 15 to education, 11 for human services, 7 to the arts, and
7% for other things. Perhaps some of the money directed to
religion and human service was given to poor people to spend,
but typically the private sector cannot be expected to provide
cash to low income people, at least in the long haul (Giving USA,
1987). Mass destitution is not something for which United Way,
private charity, foundations, or business can assume even partial
on-going responsibility. It is, in fact, not their job. Poverty is a
public problem and requires a public response. Public welfare,
by definition, is the responsbility of the public sector.
6. AFDC is a national program with federal leadership and
support.
With the impetus of generous federal match funding (vary-
ing from 50% in high income states to 65% in low income states)
and federal assumption of 50% of administrative costs, all 54
states and jurisdictions have assumed responsibility for the sup-
port of female-headed households. In addition, 28 states provide
AFDC benefits to husband/wife households.
State fiscal priorities do not tend to be poverty-oriented.
Without national leadership and the impetus of federal matching
grants, it is likely that some states would provide little aid to
needy families with children. Even with generous federal sup-
port (up to 65% in one-fourth of all states) only one-half of the
states and jurisdictions assist two-parent families. As illustrated
earlier, the history of federal assistance to the states has been
characterized by an unrelenting effort by the national govern-
ment to motivate state governments to raise grants to AFDC
families. Clearly, poverty is a national problem and requires
national remedies. Unfortunately, the United States has been
slow to adopt this view.
Further evidence of the importance of the federal spur to
Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare
states to aid their low-income residents appears in the efforts
states make to aid low-income citizens when there is no federal
grant-in-aid program. For example, what do states do for needy
people who are not elderly, blind, disabled, or in single-mother
households? What support do states give families without chil-
dren? To nondisabled adults? To poverty-stricken persons be-
tween 18 and 65? To long-term unemployed adults whose
unemployment benefits have expired? To "marginal" persons
not dassified as medically disabled but not able to work? For
persons without health insurance for themselves or their fami-
lies? To the teen-age unemployed? Finally, what help goes to
people who do receive federal aid from SSI or AFDC and who
still remain poor?
"General assistance" is the nonfederal response, and it is
meager. A remnant of the Elizabethan Poor Law, general assis-
tance is an entirely state/local program designed to aid low in-
come people who do not fit federal categories of assistance. Two-
thirds of all states and jurisdictions provide general assistance,
aiding 1.3 million people per month at an annual cost of $1.4
billion. 10
Of the 40 states with general assistance programs, 10 states
had caseloads of fewer than 1,000 people, whereas six states saw
nearly 80% of those on general assistance. Benefits were low,
averaging $127 per month per recipient in 1980. Furthermore,
general assistance benefits are usually available for limited pe-
riods (60 to 90 days). Without AFDC, millions of poor people,
especially children, would be utterly without income support.
7. AFDC has high target efficiency.
AFDC gets money and in-kind benefits to low income people
who need it and not to people who do not need it. The program
is targeted to the poor; it provides aid to many families in pov-
erty who are most in need, mainly female-headed families with
children. In contrast to old-age, survivors, disability insurance
(OASDI or "Social Security"), AFDC provides little money to
those above the poverty line. Social security lifts many people
from poverty, but at a very high cost. For example, OASDI's
yearly outlays to its more than 38 million beneficiaries are es-
timated at $220 billion in fiscal 1989-26 times the federal cost
of AFDC payments. When social security payments are in-
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creased, benefits for all 38 million recipients, poor and nonpoor,
are increased. Since benefits are raised by the same percentage
for all recipients, those with the highest benefits are enriched
the most. Each dollar increase in AFDC goes only to the poor.
8. AFDC results in two types of vertical income redistribution.
Eligibility for public assistance, Medicaid, food stamps, and
subsidized housing is determined, in part, by an applicant's
resources (value of home, car, investments, life insurance, etc.)
and by her level of income. Both federal and state laws are spe-
cific on this issue. For example, applicants who have too many
resources or too much income must "spend down" (sell the car,
divest the life insurance, etc.) to a level that demonstrates des-
titution. Thus, recently unemployed persons who wish to apply
for Medicaid must prove to the eligibility worker that they do
not have the means to survive without AFDC or Medicaid;
("means test"). In addition, they must justify need by passing
a "needs test." Careful and continuous use of the means and
needs tests insure that public aid programs retain high target
efficiency by providing aid solely to individuals near or below
the poverty line.
AFDC cash benefits are derived 55% from federal general
revenues. Federal general revenues (excluding earmarked Social
Security) are derived amost entirely-89% in fiscal 1990-from
individual and corporate income taxes, the most progressive
form of income generation (Budget of U.S. Government, 1990,
p. 4-3). The federal income tax, replete as it is with shelters and
loopholes, is still our most progressive system of taxation. 1
States, on the other hand, differ considerably in the pro-
gressivity or regressivity of their methods of revenue generation.
Some jurisdictions, such as California, Colorado, and the Dis-
trict of Columbia, depend heavily on graduated income taxes.
Others, such as Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, and Pennsylvania,
levy flat rate income taxes. Still others (Washington, Nevada,
and Texas) rely on sales tax systems that are dearly regressive.
This last system affects all income levels, but falls most heavily
on those with low income since a larger proportion of the ex-
penditures of low income people are subject to the sales tax.
In general, most of the federal money used to finance AFDC,
SSI, and in-kind benefits comes from a progressive tax system.
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In other words, the federal money that finances AFDC tends to
come from those who earn the most and is redistributed to those
who have the least. This important form of vertical redistribu-
tion takes from those who have money and gives to those who
do not. Furthermore, since the amount of the federal contribution
to individual states varies from 50 to 65% in AFDC and 50 to
78% in Medicaid, depending on the wealth of the state, redis-
tribution also occurs from the more affluent to the less affluent
states (Social Security Bulletin, Annual Supp. 1987, p. 60).
Is progressive taxation and income redistribution from upper
to lower income people and from richer to poorer states a desir-
able social goal? Most advanced nations favor this or similar
forms of redistribution. Certainly, the United States grants mod-
est vertical income redistribution through its public aid
programs.
9. AFDC allows children to remain in their own homes.
The United States supports the idea that parents are the best
qualified to raise their own children, and AFDC was specifically
designed to keep children in their homes. Because of this aid,
a low income mother may remain with her children to provide
the attention and care necessary to raise them. An increasing
number of single parents have come to depend on AFDC at
some time in their child-raising years.
Prior to 1935, the common practice was to put a destitute
child in the home of a relative or neighbor, or in a foster home
or institution (Social Security Board, Social Security in America,
1937, p. 233). AFDC allows millions of poor children to remain
in their own homes, usually with their mothers. Without AFDC,
many children might be deprived of their homes and their
parents.
10. The AFDC benefit level can be adjusted to the needs of the
family and to its size.
In theory, AFDC benefits are related to the needs of the client
and to the size of the family: the greater the need, the higher the
benefit. This theory is illustrated by the wide variation in family
benefits within the same state, since each additional family
member increases the grant level. Again, in theory, social as-
sistance programs such as AFDC and SSI are far more flexible
than the major social insurance programs such as social security
and unemployment insurance.
What's Right with Welfare?
In these latter programs the exact benefit level is established
by law and is entirely unrelated to actual client need. In fact,
those with the greatest need often have had the most tenuous
attachment to the workforce and thus have, in absolute dollars,
the lowest social insurance benefits. The greater the need, the
lower the benefit.
Due to fiscal limitations faced by many states and because
of the unpopularity of "welfare," poor people, and of AFDC,
states are reluctant to exercise the great potential flexibility of
AFDC. Benefits remain pitifully low. In practice, most states do
not provide cash benefits up to their own defined level of need.
Nevertheless, AFDC has the potential flexibility of tailoring the
benefit level to meet the special financial needs of each recipient
family, whatever that level of need might be.
11. AFDC permits recipients to spend cash benefits as they
choose.
As opposed to vouchers, food stamps, Medicaid, and other
in-kind benefits, AFDC distributes cash to clients and permits
them to spend it as they wish. Using cash is less stigmatizing
and less demoralizing to recipients than using vouchers, food
stamps and other in-kind benefits. In other words, cash benefits
enhance individual freedom and independence.
Is it wise to give cash to low income people? After all, they
may spend it irresponsibly or on items which do not benefit the
family. Money given to low-income families is used for the ben-
efit of the family to meet such needs as rent, utilities, food,
clothing and transportation. Most parents are genuinely con-
cerned wtih the well-being of their children, and spend their
money, whatever the source, for basic family needs. In any event,
AFDC benefits tend to be so low that families must pay first for
necessities or risk shut-off of utilities, loss of housing, or hunger.
12. AFDC eligibility is based solely on family compositon and
on need and is rarely linked to employment.
Except in the AFDC-E program, receiving AFDC benefits is
not labor related and is not contingent on prior attachment to
the workforce. Indeed, a woman may be entitled to AFDC social
assistance benefits who has never worked a day in her life. Pres-
ence of a child or children in the household, inadequate assets
and low income are the basic considerations in determining AFDC
elibility. In contrast, unemployment compensation, social se-
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curity, and other social insurance programs always base eligi-
bility on prior attachment to the workforce. Without a proven
history of working in covered employment, and sometimes a
substantial proven history, a person is not eligible for social
insurance. 12
Additional data could be summoned to further illustrate pos-
itive aspects of AFDC/welfare. For example, it enables women
to leave abusive relationships; ". . many women choose to re-
main with an abusive husband because the alternative is bring-
ing up children in poverty" (Straus, 1983, p. 1632; Strube, 1987,
p. 791). Moreover, high teenage pregnancy is related to low wel-
fare payments and low pregnancy to high payments (Stein, 1986,
p. 69).
Conclusion
AFDC is decidedly unpopular and much is wrong with it.
As welfare reform is again attempted, what lessons might be
learned from this analysis? The major point has been to illustrate
that it is absolutely crucial to acknowledge, understand, and
appreciate what is right with welfare. Are there other lessons?
Mothers' aid, the predecessor of AFDC, dearly illustrated
two fundamental income transfer policy principles. First, pro-
grams required in all political jurisdictions are far more suc-
cessful than those left to the option of localities. Second, the
higher the level of government that administers the transfer pro-
gram, the more successful the program as measured by degree
of implementation, uniformity among administrative jurisdic-
tions, and adequacy of benefit. These are significant principles
to remember when considering decentralization of AFDC.
In terms of AFDC program operation, several points are im-
portant. ADC was one of the three original assistance titles of
the Social Security Act of 1935. However, children were not the
focus of attention, Congress had little interest in the ADC pro-
gram, and grant levels for children were far lower than those
offered to the aged and the blind. Over one-half century later,
these disparities have yet to be rectified.
As a portion of the federal budget, of all public cash trans-
fers, or as a part of the gross national product, AFDC has never
been a large program. Some positive changes have occurred.
What's Right with Welfare?
Aid was first offered to the adult caregiver in 1950, to an un-
employed parent in 1961, and to two parents in 1962; social
services were added in 1967.
Most on AFDC are part of society's "underclass," at least
temporarily, and life at the bottom can be quite unpleasant.
Poverty disproportionately afflicts children, especially those in
large, minority, female-headed households; there it is a virtual
certainty. Benefit levels are low and have fallen drastically in
recent years; eligibility requirements and benefits vary from
state to state. Application procedures are difficult, tedious, and
demeaning. As bad as it is, much can be said in support of
AFDC.
In the first place, AFDC provides money to single-parent
families for whom the risk of poverty is greatest and for whom
little or no other income is available. About 3.8 million families,
constituting 11 million needy people, receive benefits each
month. AFDC has "undoubtedly contributed more than any other
social program to the goal of enabling children at risk of place-
ment to remain with their own families" (McGowan & Meezan,
1983, p. 69). It transfers billions of dollars in cash to those fam-
ilies most in need; it reduces poverty, and in some instances it
eliminates poverty in those it assists; and recipients have a ready
access to noncash benefits, most important, to medical care and
food stamps. AFDC is a public program, and it is a national
program; it has high target efficiency and results in vertical in-
come redistribution; benefits can be adjusted to the needs of
the recipient family, people can spend money as they choose;
and eligibility is based on family composition and never linked
to prior employment.
Blindness to these 12 charateristics greatly complicates efforts
to reform or replace AFDC. For to be successful, any new income
support program will have to include some of the income trans-
fer policies and principles that are part of our existing system.
Moreover, the inability to see what is good and what works in
American social programs makes them constantly subject to at-
tack and vulnerable to budget cutbacks. Policy makers and the
public must learn to view all of their social institutions with
some impartiality and balance, regardless of whether they favor
the beneficiaries. Only then will we have the vision to transform
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existing policies and programs into ones in which we will take
pride.
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Notes
1. I wish to express my gratitude to the following people. The late Wilbur J.
Cohen helped me to unravel the intent of early ADC legislation. Profes-
sors William C. Berleman and Robert D. Plotnick of the University of
Washington and to Mr. Richard Wright of the Department of Social and
Health Services provided valuable commentary. Ms. Lynn Clevell of
Woodinville, WA, offered many helpful suggestions.
2. "Welfare" as used in this article means AFDC (and on occasion other
means-tested programs); "AFDC" and "welfare" are terms inextricably
linked in the public mind. This is a narrow usage of "welfare." For a
comparison of the broad and narrow uses of the term, see Dear, 1982,
pp. 25-26.
3. The 1909 white House Conference declared, "Children should not be
deprived of ['home life'] ... except for urgent and compelling reasons ...
No child should be deprived of his family by reason of poverty alone"
(Proceedings of the Conference, 1909, p. 9).
4. One of the paradoxes of welfare history and a point almost forgotten is
that there was bipartisan support of the public assistance titlers and even
agreement that old-age assistance grants were too low. Of ADC, one
member said, "Eighteen dollars a month for a mother with a young child
is utterly insufficient to supply even the barest necessities of life"
(Congressional Record, 79, 5553).
In fact, the Republican minority members of the Ways and Means
Committee, who never ceased fighting the insurance titles of the Social
Security Act, were unanimous in their support of the public assistance
titles, agreeing that the benefits were too low. The minority report stated:
We favor such legislation as will encouage States already paying old-age
pensions [assistance] to provide for more adequate benefits, and will en-
courage all other states to adopt old-age pension systems. However, we
believe the amount provided in the bill to be inadequate and favor a sub-
stantial increase in the Federal Contribution. (H. Report 615, April 5, 1935,
p. 42)
What's Right with Welfare?
The Republican minority said essentially the same thing in regard to
Title IV, ADC, Title V, Maternal and Child Welfare, and Title VI, Public
health: "We would favor a stronger and more vigorous program than that
provided in this proposed legislation ..." (H. Report 615)
5. In addition to AFDC this includes Old-Age Assistance (OAA), Aid to
the Blind (AB), and Aid to the Permanently and Totally Disabled (APTD).
The latter three programs were combined in 1974 into the Supplemental
Security Income program. It does not include state general assistance
programs.
6. For a good refutation of these myths, see Barbara Leyser et al. (1985) and
US DHHS 1986 AFDC Recipient Characteristics Study.
7. These figures are for March 1988, but the total number of people aided
varies from month to month and is related to such factors as the state of
the economy and level of unemployment. See Quarterly Public Assistance
Statistics, January-March 1988, p. 12.
8. Social assistance includes AFDC, SSI, general assistance, and emergency
assistance. Social insurance includes OASDI, railroad retirement, federal
civil service, V.A. pensions, unemployment insurance, temporary disa-
bility benefits, and workers' compensation.
9. With the exception of Arizona, all states and jurisdictions participate in
Medicaid (Social Security Bulletin, April 1987, p. 58).
10. Data are partly estimated and vary for each month. In September 1986,
there were 1.3 million recipients of general assistance. Prior to 1983,
recipients numbered less than one million. (See Social Security Bulletin,
Annual Statistical Supplement 1987, p. 301; Social Security Bulletin, Decem-
ber 1988, p. 49.)
11. A progressive tax is one that levies an increasingly higher tax rate as
income increases.
12. There are a few exceptions. Beneficiaries who receive fixed-rate "special
age 72" payments (authorized in 1966) may receive small social security
payments ($139 in December 1985) without having been in covered em-
ployment if age 72 before 1968. Their numbers are small (32,000), and
they constitute less than one-tenth of the one percent of all social security
recipients. Others may receive benefits with very slight coverage. Of
course, survivors and dependents with no work history receive benefits,
but their eligibility is still contingent on that of a covered employee,
Social Security Bulletin,A1 March 1986, pp. 35-36.

